The RSA trapdoor proposed in Ross Anderson's recent letter can be broken.
p and p 0 in such a way that the hardware manufacturer can easily factor the RSA modulus n = pp 0 . Factoring the modulus hopefully remains di cult for all other parties.
The proposed trapdoor is based on a secret value A known only to the manufacturer. For 256-bit RSA primes, the secret value A is 200 bits long. The device generates primes p of the form p = rA + q = r(q; A)A + q; (1) where q is at most about 100 bits long, and r is 56 bits long and a function of A and q. To factor the RSA modulus n = pp 0 , the manufacturer reduces the modulus modulo A to recover the product0 , following the relationship n = pp 0 = rr 0 A 2 + (rq 0 + r 0 q)A +0 :
The 200-bit product0 is easily factored, and the manufacturer recovers the primes p and p 0 according to Equation 1. One way to overcome this attack is to assign a di erent secret value to each device, a precaution Anderson has suggested for another purpose. Then a user can only factor his or her own moduli. The user does not need 14 moduli to nd A, however. Two prime factors p and p 0 su ce, since the fraction r 0 =r is such a good approximation to the fraction p 0 =p that it is guaranteed to be a convergent in the continued fraction expansion of p 0 =p.
The user can therefore detect a trapdoor even if the device generates each modulus with a di erent secret value.
The manufacturer's only recourse, at least as far as the proposed trapdoor is concerned, is for the device to generate each modulus with a di erent secret value and to keep the prime factors secret. In such a situation, the manufacturer may as well preload the device with the primes and escrow copies|a practical \trapdoor" to which all cryptosystems, not just RSA, are vulnerable.
